INTRODUCTION
Increased innovation is the main theoretical economic benefit of patent protection. (Bessen and Maskin 2009) Of course, we do not enjoy this benefit free. Our patent system includes a costly application process through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and costly method of deciding unresolved patent disputes through federal litigation. These social costs of maintaining our system have greatly increased in recent decades as both the number of patent applications and filed patent lawsuits have tripled since the early 1980s (Jaffe and Lerner 2004; Bessen and Meuer, 2005b) .
Many of the arguments of economists and legal scholars critical of the health of the patent system boil down to the idea these burgeoning costs have not been matched by increases in the innovation benefit. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) , in particular, argue an increasingly swamped PTO has granted many patents with negligible innovation benefit, particularly those covering technologies only recently patented on a large scale. These include biotechnology, software and business method patents.
Further, opportunistic litigation by licensing firms may disproportionally add to increased costs because the more uncertain scope of software and methods makes these patents ideal tools to extract rents from independently inventing producers in "hold up" litigation. (Bessen and Meuer 2008) The evidence for these arguments remains limited. However, an analysis of judicial decisions on the invalidity defenses of anticipation and obviousness can assist in determining their credibility.
Anticipated patents are legally invalid because they cover old ideas, which are not innovative by definition. Obvious patents are invalid because a professional in the same field would have known how to solve the problem the invention is directed at in the same way. While an obvious solution is new in the sense the "inventor" was the first to employ the solution, it generated no new knowledge. Thus, whether judged obvious or anticipated, the implication is the patented ideas have negligible value as innovation so that resources used to obtain and enforce that patent were wasted.
Despite this extreme implication, we know little about anticipation or obviousness decisions. In this paper I remedy that gap in our knowledge by analyzing the characteristics of 980 patents subject to final anticipation or obviousness decisions in 579 cases filed between 2000 and 2010. To account for Miller: Where's the Innovation? 2 selection effects and adjudicator bias, I control for many characteristics of the parties and adjudication and utilize a selection corrected probit model. I thus obtain unconditional estimates of the likelihood a patent with a given characteristic will be found to lack innovation value.
My results suggest the idea that the patent system's efficiency is harmed by the existence of too many non-innovative patents is quite plausible. I estimate 28 percent of patents would be found at least partially invalid if subject to an anticipation or obviousness decision. Patents covering software and business methods, the subject to frequent criticism, have unconditional invalidity rates of 39 and 56 percent. The rate for licensing firm owned patents is 61 percent. In contrast, energy, medical and semiconductor patents have lower than average and biotechnology patents average invalidity rates.
Other results inform our understanding of open patent law and economics issues. Regarding patent value, I find patents with more claims or citations are not significantly more or less likely to be invalidated on innovation based grounds. Concerning the rationality of litigious patent owners and in contrast to Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2011) , I find patents asserted in more cases are less likely to be invalidated. Concerning bias, I find several District Courts have significantly different invalidity rates and that the Federal Circuit is more likely than trial courts to find innovation-based invalidity.
In Part 2 of this paper I explain anticipation and obviousness, their connection to innovation value, and why the PTO may regularly grant patents lacking innovation value. Part 3 describes my analysis, Part 4 reports my results and Part 5 explains them.
INNOVATION-BASED PATENT INVALIDITY
I begin by briefly describing the U.S. system of obtaining and enforcing patents, the courts' role in enforcing requirements for patentability and the law of anticipation and obviousness.
The Patent Office, the Courts, and Invalidity Defenses
In the United States, inventors apply for patents from the PTO. The heart of a patent application is one or more "claims" that specifically define what ideas the patent will protect. The basic requirements for the ideas expressed in the claims to be legally patentable are that they cover patentable subject matter, Miller: Where's the Innovation? 3 are new and useful, and non-obvious. (35 USC § § 101, 103) If the inventor demonstrates to the PTO that all requirements are met, the PTO grants the patent.
Once obtained, the patent provides its owner the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the invention described in the claims. (35 USC § 271) Parties violating the owner's exclusive rights are liable for infringement, and may be sued for damages and injunctive relief.
(35 USC § 271) While there is a legal presumption that PTO-granted patents are valid, meaning they meet all patentability requirements, invalidity is a defense to patent infringement and an alleged infringer may overcome the presumption and demonstrate the patent is invalid with "clear and convincing evidence." (Microsoft Corporation v. i4i Limited Partnership, et. al., 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011 Patent litigation in the United States is exclusively federal and all lawsuits must be filed in a federal district court. Since 1982, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (CAFC) has had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases.
Anticipation and Obviousness
Anticipation and obviousness are invalidity defenses directly related to two of the basic patentability requirements. Alleged infringers attack the novelty of a patent by alleging anticipation and its non-obviousness by alleging obviousness. Validity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis so that all, part, or none of a patent may be found invalid in patent litigation. Whether a claim is anticipated or obvious is mainly determined by comparing the ideas contained in the claim to the "prior art". Prior art includes all public knowledge at the time of invention related to an invention. CAFC precedent makes clear the legal distinction between anticipation and obviousness.
"Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim." (Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 , 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983 Obviousness, in contrast, may be based on multiple prior art references:
Determining obviousness requires considering whether two or more pieces of prior art could be combined, or a single piece of prior art could be modified, to produce the claimed invention. This analysis typically invokes the familiar teaching-suggestion-motivation ("TSM") test, asking whether a person having ordinary skill in the art would have found some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine or modify the prior art references. (Comaper v. Best Buy, 596 F.3d 1343 , 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010 )) The legal connection between anticipation and obviousness is apparent-the ideas described in anticipated claims where already contained in a single earlier work, while obvious claims were partially described in earlier works and it was "obvious" to combine or modify them to obtain the full content of the claim. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) explain the clear connection between innovation value as the main justification for patent protection and the invalidity defenses of anticipation and obviousness.
Anticipation, Obviousness, and Innovation Value
1 They argue the U.S. patent system is "broken" in large part because institutional and legal changes have resulted in the PTO granting too many patents with negligible innovation value.
They begin by explaining the fundamental economic justification for patent protection:
If there were no incentives for those who discover and develop new technology, it is likely that fewer innovations would be developed, slowing progress and the benefits it brings. Potential inventors realize that without adequate protection rivals will rapidly copy their discoveries, and that therefore innovation is at best an uncertain route to future profits. As a result, companies would be unlikely to spend significant amounts of money on Research and Development that is the source of new products and processes in a modern economy.
(Jaffe and Lerner 2004) Thus, patent protection benefits society when it increases innovation. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) continue by explaining that for the system to be effective in furthering this goal:
[T]he party who is the first to invent a given product or process is the party that is awarded a patent. This analytical construct is embodied in patent law within the idea that a patent cannot be granted unless the patent application is for an invention that is both 'novel' and 'non-obvious'.
(Jaffe and Lerner 2004) Anticipated and obvious patents are thus invalid because the party who obtained the patent was not the inventor of the ideas the patents contain. 9 (1966) , stating: "The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. " Further, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) , the Court explained: "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant Innovation is knowledge production but anticipated or obvious patents contain no new knowledge. Thus, such patents lack innovation value. Accordingly, the existence of these invalidity defenses ensures the enjoyment of the exclusive rights that patents protect is connected to the rationale for that protection-to incent innovation. Unfortunately, before a court can determine that a patent lacks innovation it and alleged infringers must expend significant resources in litigation. 3 Thus, as measured after adjudication, the existence of these patents is a net social loss.
How Rare Are Patents that Lack Innovation Value?
If the PTO is empowered to screen applications that lack the legal requirements, we may wonder how frequently patents are granted on old or obvious ideas. According to many observers the answer is often. 4 Jaffe and Lerner (2004) argue the PTO has granted many patents of dubious innovation value for several reasons. First, the number of applications tripled between 1983 and 2002, swamping the PTO's examination resources. Second, after the early 1990s, the PTO was no longer tax-payer-funded but instead operated on the basis of increased patent application fees. This change created incentives for the PTO to quickly process applications and to be perceived as applicant friendly. (Jaffe and Lerner 2004) The third reason Jaffe and Lerner (2004) offer pertains to technologies only recently patented on a large scale-namely software, business methods and biotechnology. 5 Jaffe and Lerner (2004) argue that patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare." 3 Bessen and Meurer (2008, p. 169) calculate the average cost, in legal fees alone, for a patent case to be litigated through summary judgment as $500,000 and the cost through trial as $4,000,000. (2004), at 87-95 (criticizing lenient non-obvious standards, particularly for business method and biotechnology patents); Shapiro (2004) , at 1018 (noting that complaints regarding the PTO "typically allege that the [PTO] issues many questionable patents" including those that were "obvious at the time the patent application was filed"); Barton (2003) , at 477-78 (arguing that the non-obvious standard applied by the PTO and courts today is not as strict as that articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham); Parker (2002) , at 305-07 (arguing that the PTO has recently granted a number of obvious patents)); Thomas (2001) (discussing problems at the PTO in conducting nonobvious analyses); Merges (1999), at 598 (noting that "[t] he easiest way to raise standards [at the PTO], conceptually, is to tighten the nonobviousness requirement"); and Lemley and O'Brien (1997) when patenting of these subjects increased in the 1990s the PTO lacked examiners knowledgeable in these fields to thoroughly review the prior art. Perhaps more critical, examiners may have frequently missed the relevant prior art because of their overreliance on older patents in their prior art searches.
Since these technologies were rarely patented before, the existing art was described in other sources, including professional journals and pre-existing product descriptions. (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) Thus, there are plausible reasons to believe that during the last two decades the PTO has frequently granted patents on old or obvious ideas.
Existing data on anticipation and obviousness litigation decisions supports this conclusion. Allison and Lemley (1998) Allison and Lemley (1998) report 41 percent of anticipation and 33 percent of obviousness decisions found invalidity. This suggests it is not rare for courts to conclude the PTO mistakenly granted patents on old or obvious ideas.
Evidence that certain types of patents are more likely to be old or obvious is scant. Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2011) analyzed the litigation success of 106 "most-litigated" patents asserted in eight or more lawsuits between 2000 and 2008. They compared their success to a matched sample of patents litigated once. They found that patents in both their "most litigated" or "once litigated" samples were more likely to be invalidated if they were non-practicing entity (NPE) owned or covered softwareprecisely one of the technologies Jaffe and Lerner (2004) argue the PTO has had difficulty examining. Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2011) found 60 of the 86 patents that lost in court were invalidated.
While obviousness was not one of the three most common bases for the invalidation, anticipation was second. They did not report the basis on which each of the 60 patents was invalidated, but we can deduce a large percentage of the invalidated patents in their sample were invalidated on innovation based grounds, were owned by NPEs, covered software and were asserted in many different lawsuits. Thus, the empirical evidence that exists suggests innovation-based invalidity is frequently litigated and found by courts despite the fact the PTO is tasked with rejecting applications on old or obvious ideas.
STUDY DESIGN
Having explained how anticipation and obviousness support the goal of patent protection and why these defenses may be increasingly necessary in a system where the PTO frequently grants patents on old or obvious ideas, I now describe my data and analytical method.
Data
Many factors may influence whether a patent is invalidated for anticipation or obviousness.
Referencing Marco's (2004) analysis of patent litigation outcomes, I model the validity decision as a function of the characteristics of the asserted patents, the parties, and adjudication.
I used two main data sources to create my sample of final innovation-based invalidity decisions.
The first was the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC), which details every patent lawsuit filed in the U.S. from 2000 to the present. 7 In the IPLC I identified 980 patents that faced a final decision on anticipation and/or obviousness in 579 lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2010. 8 My unit of analysis is a patent-case pairing, such that my sample includes multiple data points where innovation-based invalidity was decided for multiple patents in a single lawsuit.
By final decision, I mean that the adjudications in my sample were either decided by CAFC on appeal, were immediately appealable, or were grants of summary judgment that a patent was not invalid for anticipation or obviousness after which the case terminated without appeal. Thus, my data set includes invalidity determinations by the CAFC, by the trial court on JNOV, bench trial or grant of summary judgment, and by jury trial. It does not include denials of summary judgment, which merely hold disputed facts remain to be tried to determine whether or not a patent is invalid. 
Analytical Method in Light of Adjudicator Bias and Selection Effects
I aim to infer the types of patents more or less likely to lack innovation value. A simple probit regression model would appear appropriate, but two key biases cast doubt on this strategy. The first,
adjudicator bias, appears easy to control for by considering whether a judge, jury or appeals court makes the decision and in which district court. It seems unlikely all would err in the same direction but Mandel (2006) reports compelling evidence from experiments on mock jurors that the non-obviousness requirement is uniformly applied too stringently due to "hindsight bias." 10 Most scholars, however, believe the courts are biased towards validating obvious patents. 11 I adopt this view cautiously, and account for adjudicator bias with comprehensive adjudication controls.
Controlling for selection effects, the second bias, is not as simple. Selection effects refer to the process of parties choosing disputes for trial as opposed to settlement. Priest and Klein (1984) created the first formal model of this process which predicts both the rate at which disputes will be tried and the plaintiff's win rate at trial. (Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999) In the basic model these rates depend on the: 1) Decision standard; 2) Amount of uncertainty; and 3) Degree of stake asymmetry. (Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999) Later models predict other factors influence the plaintiff win rate, including asymmetric information, rent seeking, entry deterrence, or differences in risk aversion. (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989) These factors influence plaintiff win rates and confound inferences about the population of potential disputes (in my case all patents) from the set of disputes selected for adjudication (in my case 9 As a check, I compared the characteristics from that file to electronic PTO patent records. 10 According to Mandel (2006) , determining obviousness at the time the invention was made requires the fact-finder to "step backward in time to a moment when the invention was unknown. innovation-based validity decisions). For example, without accounting for selection bias, I cannot infer that all amateur inventor patents are more likely to lack innovation value from a result that litigated inventor patents are more likely to be invalidated. Perhaps amateur inventors have lower stakes than other owners and thus lose more frequently by litigating weaker patents through final decision.
Probit Model with Selection Effects
In my multivariate analysis, I attempt to control for selection effects by utilizing an econometric model based on Heckman's two-step method ( (1)
I obtain maximum likelihood estimates for this system of equations using Stata's "heckprob".
Whether selection effects exist can be determined from the random effects. u i and v i are random effects separate to each equation and ε i is the shared random effect. If there are selection effects, λ and thus the correlation between the residuals of the two equations, ρ, is nonzero.
β and γ are observed variables that explain I i and S i respectively. β includes the patent, party and adjudication characteristics I describe in the next section. As Marco (2004) explains, patent and patent owner characteristics that influence validity decisions also theoretically influence selection for such decisions. I include these traits in γ. However, adjudication and alleged infringer traits are unobserved for patents not selected for adjudication and thus excluded from the selection equation. 
RESULTS
In Section 4.1, I report my sample's overall invalidity rate and explain the patent, party and adjudication traits that may influence these invalidity decisions. I report descriptive statistics and bivariate validity rate comparisons for each trait. I report my multivariate results in Section 4.2.
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Comparisons Innovation-Based Invalidity Rates
For each final decision I located, I determined whether the patent was found invalid in whole or in part on the basis of anticipation and/or obviousness. Again, patent validity is determined on a claimby-claim basis. Thus, I designate as "Part" invalid patents with some but not all claims asserted by the owner invalidated by the court. I define patents as "All" invalid if the adjudicator invalidated all asserted claims and "Not" invalid if no claim was invalidated. As seen in Table 1 , partial invalidation is least common. Thus asserted claims usually stand or fall together. lack innovation value-I combine anticipation and obviousness decisions for the remainder of my analysis and refer to them as innovation-based validity decisions ("A or O" in all tables). 16 I find that 37 percent of patents subject to an innovation-based validity decision were at least partially invalidated. Table 2 report the number (and percentage) of adjudicated patents in my sample in each industry found "All", "Part" or "Not" anticipated or obvious.
The fourth column reports the total number of patents in my sample I assigned to that industry. 16 I stress that outside the separate anticipation and obviousness statistics I report at the top of Table 1 , my analysis includes only a single data point for each patent-case pair. Thus, the 23 patents I identify as found obvious but not anticipated in a single lawsuit and the two found anticipated but not obvious are included only once in my sample. I code all of these as being found "A or O" invalid since they were in fact invalidated on one of these two bases. 17 These industry and technology categories are precisely defined starting on page 6 of Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2009) . To ensure accuracy, I reviewed the invention description contained in the PTO's electronic copy of each patent and compared it to Allison, Lemley, and Walker's (2009) Services patents were less likely. These differences are consistent with conventional opinion of which industries contain more or less non-innovative patents. However, only the differences for the Computer, Medical, and Energy Service industry are significant. 18 In Table 2 and subsequent descriptive statistics tables, I identify significantly different validity rates for a given characteristic with an asterisk ("*"). For categorical variables, I tested the null that there is no difference in the validity rate between patents with and without that characteristic using both Chi-square and Fisher's exact tests. For other variables, I use independent samples t-tests. In each case, significance represents a p value < 0.05. Table A1 .
Application Duration. Patents applications pending before the PTO for a longer period may have been subject to higher scrutiny with respect to their novelty and non-obviousness such that we would expect them to better survive an invalidity challenge. Conversely, longer duration may signal the application's subject matter was less clear and thus more likely to be invalidated. (Marco 2004) To test these possibilities, I measure the number of days between each patent's initial application date and grant date. I find that patents judged not invalid were on average prosecuted 36 days less than those found at least partially invalid. However, this difference is insignificant (p value = 0.33).
Grant Year. Older patents may better survive innovation-based invalidity challenges as there was more time for alleged infringers to litigate their validity and because there is less prior art on which to invalidate them. Patents judged valid were on average granted a year before those at least partially invalidated. This difference is statistically significant (p value = 0.00).
Number of Claims. We may expect that patents with more claims are more valuable for two The owners I name individual inventors were named parties to the lawsuits in my sample or litigated in the name of a shell LLC that solely enforces that inventor's patents. In both cases, I verified the individual was the patent's inventor from PTO records or court pleadings.
Patent licensing firms were either self identified as such in court pleadings, firm websites or in media coverage of their litigation. I sought to narrowly include in this category only firms in the business of generating revenue from the patents they own. I designated close cases as either product companies or inventors. Finally, a few patent owners in my sample were government, university or other not-for-profit research organizations. I designated these owners as "Other".
19 Forbes' list for 2011 is available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/21/private-companies-11_rank.html. Table 4 reports that three owner types possess significantly different invalidity rates. Licensing firm and inventor patents were less likely to be judged valid (48.3 and 52.6 percent respectively). Thus, licensing firm patents join business methods as a rare species more likely to be at least partially invalidated. Finally, small product firm patents had a higher validity rate than other patents. 
Other Party/Suit Characteristics
Now that I have discussed the owner type, I turn to other characteristics of the parties that may impact the likelihood a patent is invalidated on innovation-based grounds. Invalidity rates for the first three characteristics, which are indicators, are listed in Appendix Table A2 . Summary statistics for each of the second three numerical variables are listed in Appendix Table A3 .
Foreign Party. Whether a patent owner or an alleged infringer is a foreign or U.S. entity may predict success in innovation-based invalidity decisions as it may be more expensive for foreign entities to litigate in the United States. I thus determined whether patent owners and alleged infringers were foreign or domestic entities. I find foreign owned patents were not significantly more or less likely to be invalidated (p value = 0.43). In contrast, foreign alleged infringers were significantly less successful in proving invalidity (28.5 versus 38.9% with a p value = 0.02).
Large Alleged Infringer. The financial resources of alleged infringers should predict their success in proving invalidity. All alleged infringers in my sample are product firms, which makes sense given infringement requires making, using or selling embodiments of the patented technology. As with Referencing Table A2 , it is also interesting that nearly 70 percent of patents in my sample were asserted against large firms. This may represent a combination of large firms being more likely to defend through adjudication and patent owners targeting large firms with deeper pockets.
Number of Patents Asserted. I collected the number of patents asserted in each case by the "primary" patent owner. By "primary" I mean the instigator of infringement allegations and do not include patents asserted in infringement counter-claims against that "primary" owner. Owners asserting more patents at once may possess strong patent portfolios less likely to be invalidated. owners who file multiple lawsuits "might do so because they have a stronger than average patent and therefore face less risk of invalidity." Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2011) report that owners of the "most-litigated" patents lost adjudicated lawsuits much more frequently than once-litigated patent owners.
Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2011) results suggest the possibility that repeat patent plaintiffs are irrational in not suing all alleged infringers in one action so as to avoid re-litigating validity issues.
Measured as a simple count of total lawsuits filed, I find that the patents that survived innovationbased invalidity challenges were asserted in significantly more cases than those found invalid (p value = These facts suggest my sample is geographically representative.
One may expect owners to gravitate towards patent-friendly districts, particularly because they have discretion in selecting the district in which to file suit. The significantly higher 76 percent validity rate for the Eastern District of Texas ("TXED"), known as particularly owner-friendly, supports this idea.
However, several of the most patent-litigation intensive districts in my sample have significantly lower 22 Moore (2000) finds patent owners win 65% of infringement suits but only 42% of declaratory actions decided by juries. She found the patent owner win rate nearly identical and close to 50% when the judge adjudicated. However, juries decide innovation-based validity much more frequently than judges. 23 The lower trial invalidity rate is driven by the prevalence of juries. Of the 648 invalidity decisions either finally adjudicated at trial or adjudicated there before a later appellate decision, 70% were decided by juries. And in my sample, juries validated patents significantly more often than judges (76.9% versus 63.9% with p value = 0.01). 24 While the Middle District of Florida ("FLMD") and the Western District of Wisconsin ("WIWD") are not in the IPLC top 10, they are also active districts for patent litigation.
validity rates. These include the Northern District of California ("CAND"), the Northern District of Illinois ("ILND"), the Eastern District of Michigan ("MIED") and the District of Nevada ("NV").
Before offering owners of patents with questionable innovation value advice on where to file suit, however, I must determine if these differences persist after accounting for differences in other relevant patent, party and adjudication characteristics. I thus now report my multivariate results.
Multivariate Analysis
But before reporting the significant predictors of innovation-based invalidity from the selection corrected probit model described in section 3.3, I address a lingering econometric issue with this model. The best candidate for an exclusion restriction among the characteristics I analyze is whether or not a patent is foreign owned. I theorize that foreign patent owners are less likely to litigate their patents through adjudication because it is relatively more expensive. In contrast, foreign owners should not be more or less likely to win innovation based validity decisions after they have chosen to incur those costs. 25 I confirmed these ideas through unreported regressions of the likelihood a patent is invalidated on the foreign patent owner indicator. In none of these was foreign ownership even close to a significant predictor of invalidity. However, it is a negative and highly significant predictor of selection for an invalidity decision. Accordingly, I utilize foreign patent ownership as my exclusion restriction.
The first two columns of Table 5 report my results for both an uncorrected and selection corrected probit. The third column reports estimates for the selection equation used in the selection corrected regression. Concerning the invalidity equation, I include all patent, party and adjudication characteristics in both the uncorrected and corrected specification. This includes indicator variables for the most active 25 My adjudication controls account for the possibility that some adjudicators may be biased against foreign owners. Foreign ownership is not a significant predictor of innovation-based invalidity even if these controls are excluded.
district courts and I report their coefficients and significance in Table 6 . I omit small product firm owner and trial adjudication categories. In the selection equation, I include all patent and owner characteristics.
To simplify discussion of my results, I consolidate several of the industry and technology categories described in my bivariate analysis. I merge the Software and Pure Software categories into one Software indicator including all patents primarily claiming data processing. 26 Because they have been particularly criticized, I include a Business Method indicator for the subset of Software patents within that category. I use a "pure" Electronics technology category that omits all patents with at least one software claim. Finally, I omit Biotechnology as an industry category since all such patents in my sample fall within both the Biotechnology industry and technology category.
Selection Bias and the Selection Equation
Surprisingly, the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 
Significant Predictors of Innovation-Based Invalidity
Turning to the invalidity equation, both Software and Business Method patents are significantly more likely to be invalidated. In the basic probit, Semiconductor, Medical, Energy and Financial patents are significantly less likely to be invalidated. However, in the selection-corrected model the Financial category is insignificance. The Energy and Medical categories are only significant to a 90 percent level.
Neither of the two patent characteristics frequently used to proxy value-number of claims and average citations-is a significant predictor of innovation-based validity. However, as noted, both are positive predictors that they will be selected for such decisions. Allison, Lemley, and Moore (2004) argue litigated patents tend to be more valuable to their owners than non-litigated patents because litigation is costly. If this theory is true, my results support the distinction that number of claims and average citations proxy private value but not a lower chance of lacking innovation value.
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As for the remaining two prosecution-related patent characteristics, the first, grant year, is significant across all specifications. Thus, older patents are less likely to be invalidated. However, the second, application duration, is uniformly insignificant.
Licensing Firm is the only significant ownership predictor that a patent is invalidated. The indicator for Other owners is significant to the 90% confidence level in the uncorrected but not the corrected specification. For other party characteristics, patents asserted against foreign alleged infringers are significantly less likely to be invalidated. The number of alleged infringers and the total number of lawsuits in which a patent has been asserted are significant negative predictors that a patent is invalidated.
Finally, patents adjudged by CAFC are significantly more likely to be invalidated, as are those defended in declaratory actions. TXED, AZ, DE, MA and CASD are less likely, while MIED and ILND are more likely, to find validity. These results suggest forum-shopping opportunities exist.
Unconditional Probabilities
Just how many old or obvious patents exist? From my selection corrected model, I obtain estimates of the likelihood any patent within my population would be found invalid, regardless of whether it has been adjudicated. 27 I find the unconditional probability a patent is at least partially invalidated as anticipated or obvious is 0.28. 28 In other words, more than one in four patents granted by the PTO has at least one non-innovative claim. This result strongly supports Jaffe and Lerner's (2004) argument that the PTO has granted many patents on non-innovative ideas.
I estimate fewer non-innovative patents in most of the industries that are significant negative predictors of innovation-based invalidity. The unconditional probability that patents are at least partially invalidated is 0.13 for the energy industry, 0.16 for the semiconductor industry, and 0.20 for the medical industry. Financial patents have an unconditional probability of 0.38, higher than the rate for all patents.
Why then is the financial industry category such a large, significantly negative predictor of innovation 27 In section 3.3, I defined my population as all patents applied for during the same days as the adjudicated patents. 28 I determine this probability with all independent variables measured at their means. For the reported industry and technology probabilities, industry and technology variables are measured based on the percentage of patents in a given category that fall within each of the industry and technology categories. All other patent and adjudication characteristics are measured at their means.
based invalidity? The answer is that all financial industry patents in my sample protect either Software or Business Method technology. Thus, while financial patents have a higher than average invalidity rate, they are less likely invalid than other software patents.
Excluding business methods, Software patents have an unconditional probability of being at least partially invalid of 0.39. The probability is far higher for Business Methods (0.56). Finally, I estimate the unconditional probability that a licensing-firm-owned patent will be found at least partially invalid as 0.61, higher than that of the software and method patents they typically enforce.
DISCUSSION
My results have implications for many patent law and economics issues including the use of patent characteristics as value proxies and forum shopping. In this discussion, however, I focus on investigating the significantly different innovation-based invalidity rates across industries and technologies and for licensing firms.
Industry and Technology Differences
In both my basic probit and selection-corrected probit model I include many patent, party and adjudication characteristics that control for adjudication bias and selection effects including uncertainty, semiconductor patents which are less likely to be invalidated may also be considered a category of newly patented technology. There is, however, a clear distinction between medical, energy, semiconductor and biotechnology patents on the one hand and software and business method patents on the other-the first group consists of more definite and concrete claims while the second group covers more abstract ideas.
In contrast with Jaffe and Lerner (2004) , Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue the main failure of the U.S. patent system has been the breakdown in notice of what particular patents protect. A key source of this breakdown was the increased patenting of software and business methods, which claim abstract ideas.
With abstract ideas it is more difficult to "relate the words that describe patent boundaries to actual technologies." (Bessen and Meuer 2008) They argue the proliferation of patents with more uncertain scope exacerbated the increase in costly patent litigation. Meurer 2008) Bessen and Meuer (2008) recognize that an increase in the number of patents with "fuzzy boundaries" is not inconsistent with the conclusion that there are more non-innovative patents. This is because PTO examiners are not immune from the greater uncertainty surrounding software and business methods, and may have been more likely to grant old or obvious patents covering these technologies.
Thus, the underlying determinant of the likelihood a patent is invalidated on innovation-based grounds that I observe is not specifically whether the type of technology has been patented for only a short time but generally whether it is more difficult for the PTO to review.
In contrast to the abstract claims of software and method patents, claimed biotechnology and semiconductor innovation is concrete embodying, for example, a newly discovered use of one particular Further, referencing my selection effects discussion I observe that regardless of technology licensing firm patents are significantly more likely to be selected for an invalidity decision. If this reflects uncertainty, then it suggests some licensing firms may strategically assert patents whose content is even more uncertain than the average software and business method patent. Of course, the higher selection rate may also indicate higher valued disputes. But this is also consistent with the theory that licensing firms target the large producers of an industry with patents of potentially broad scope.
Whether they indicate more uncertainty, higher dispute values or both, the higher selection rate is consistent with the theory that licensing firms strategically litigate patents of broad and uncertain scope against product firms in litigation with potentially high damage awards. It just so happens that this business model utilizes the types of patents most likely to lack innovation value.
Uncertain Welfare and Policy Implications
While there are many non-innovative software and business method patents, many protect valuable innovation. This is evidenced by the fact courts frequently find these types of patents novel and non-obvious and grant their owners, including licensing firms, large damage awards. Conversely, alleged If owners of the vast majority of patents are unwilling to invest in their defense or maintenance after they are granted, then it is likely wasteful to increase the scrutiny that all patents receive during prosecution.
Thus, if any legal reform targeting non-innovative patents is welfare improving, it will likely focus on patents considered particularly valuable by owners and prospective infringers. Perhaps the best option is to increase the ability of potential infringers to challenge the validity of claimed ideas during the application process or at least prior to litigation. The recently signed America Invents Act includes such reforms 31 but it will be some time before we possess sufficient data to determine their effect.
CONCLUSION
Exploring the characteristics of anticipation and obviousness adjudications is important because of the extreme ex post economic implication for the particular patents invalidated in these decisions.
After years of PTO examination and litigation to a final decision on the merits, the trier-of-fact determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that these patents where never entitled to legal protection because they protect old or obvious ideas. Thus, they imposed significant costs on the PTO, alleged infringers and the courts without disclosing any appreciable innovation.
I estimate a surprising 28 percent of all patents would be at least partially invalidated as anticipated or obvious if litigated. I cannot say whether this number is inefficiently high, but this estimate strongly supports Jaffe and Lerner's (2004) assertion that non-innovative patents are common. Further, consistent with their and other recent criticism, software and business method are even more likely to lack innovation value. Patents protecting innovation in the semiconductor, medical and energy industries are less likely to lack innovation value. These differences plausibly depend on the relative difficulty PTO examiners face in comparing claimed ideas to the relevant prior art. In turn, this difficulty likely depends on the size of the existing body of relevant prior art and relative uncertainty of the content of the claims.
I find evidence that licensing firms are strategic, aggressively asserting software and business method patents with more uncertain meaning and scope. This business model is costly, however, as the patents they select are even more likely to lack innovation value than the average software or method patent. In my next paper I will further investigate the behavior of licensing firms and other repeat patent plaintiffs in light of my finding here of a negative relationship between the number of lawsuits in which a patent is asserted and its likelihood of lacking innovation. This contrasts with Allison, Lemley, and
Walker's (2011) conclusion that owners of the "most-litigated" patents act irrationally.
Finally my analysis has revealed other interesting characteristics of innovation-based invalidity decisions. These inform past patent litigation research on the connection between patent characteristics and value and the bias of different adjudicators. 
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